In addition to indexed ETFs, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been asked to permit "transparent" actively managed exchangetraded funds. The portfolio managers of these funds will announce, prior to trading, that the fund will buy or sell specific securities during the next trading session. Whatever appeal a transparent actively managed fund might lack in the minds of sentient investors or portfolio managers, a number of such funds will probably be launched. 1, 2 In actively managed mutual funds and other actively managed portfolios, trading plans are considered highly confidential.
3 Absent confidentiality, advance disclosure of portfolio changes could be misused by traders who value any information that might help them scalp a profit by anticipating or participating in someone else's trading activity.
Like the published S&P and Russell benchmark index composition changes, revelation of any portfolio trading plans will disclose a specific demand for liquidity from securities markets. Publishing this demand for liquidity reveals information that thoughtful fund portfolio managers and investors have generally preferred not to have disclosed. If liquidity demands are revealed only by the entry of anonymous orders that can be executed over several days or weeks, the market impact of these liquidity demands is often modest. If liquidity demands are openly published and specified as to source, size and time, the market impact cost of a transparent trade is likely to be significantly greater than the impact of a comparable anonymous trade. To measure the cost of trading transparency, we need to separate the cost of transparency from the cost of liquidity in transparent trades. To this end, it is useful to define the cost of trading transparency as the total trading cost of implementing a transparent transaction minus the liquidity cost of an otherwise comparable nontransparent transaction. This definition requires a few timing calls in some instances, but the level of controversy on the timing calls seems small. The price changes associated with transparency will usually precede the substantial trading volume associated with liquidity demand.
Why Trading Transparency is Costly
The market impact of front running pre-announced trades is obvious, but measuring the cost of trading transparency is more complex than most index changes suggest. With increasing use of transparent trading by hundreds of new exchange-traded funds, it is inevitable that multiple transparent traders will sometimes announce plans to buy or sell the same security during the same narrow time window. Once similar trading intentions have been announced at the same time by several of these funds, it will be difficult for any of the funds to change course or delay the trade. If these trades were not disclosed, one or more of the managers could decide to trade patiently -or not at all if stock prices changed too much to make the trade attractive. Market participants will rely on published trading intentions. Indeed, a transparent trading product structure seems to create public entitlement to knowledge of the fund's trading plans.
The transparent trading process of ETFs using custom indexes and pre-announced active management trades should give us enough information to isolate the incremental cost of trading transparency to many fund investors. Before we measure the cost, however, we need to examine the variety of ways that trading plans become transparent.
Exhibit 1 lists some major categories of transparent and semitransparent trades. The type of transparency characteristic of an index or an active management investment process determines how easily we can isolate and measure the cost of transparency. Some index and trade disclosure policies make the cost of transparency easier to isolate than other disclosure policies.
(Insert Exhibit 1 about here)
Benchmark Index Composition Changes
From the early days of indexing, a fundamental expectation (voiced by Malkiel [1973] pp. 226-7 and Samuelson [1974] among others) has been that the "passive" investment method that has become known as "indexing" 4 would reduce transaction costs because portfolio turnover would be as low as possible. In the context of this expectation, the magnitude of the transaction costs incurred by investors in portfolios based on some major indexes is ironic in the extreme.
5
In fairness to the publishers of benchmark indexes, they have been sensitive to the impact of transaction costs on index fund investors. Of course, index publishers cannot eliminate all composition changes.
Companies are acquired or go out of business and new companies sell shares to the public. 6 Only the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000 have had enough committed indexed assets to make their composition changes generate much excitement. The cost of turnover in even these indexes has not been an issue outside the "pretty sleepy community" 7 of index publishers and their clients until recently. However, the fact that transparent index composition trades are costly is now well understood.
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There are two very distinct types of benchmark index composition change transparency:
(1) Most major benchmark index families are based on rules.
The rules for indexes in the Russell, MSCI, FTSE and Dow Jones index families are well known to index composition arbitrage traders.
(2) In contrast, Standard & Poor's has an Index Committee that makes decisions to change the composition of its indexes in secret and announces the changes, typically after the market close a few days before the change becomes effective.
Looking first at Standard & Poor's, the S&P Index Committee has a number of formal policies; 9 but the Committee's selection of a replacement company is rarely so inevitable that traders will mark up the share price of a replacement candidate on the chance that it will be selected by the Committee on a specific date. David Blitzer, Chairman of the S&P Index Committee, has estimated that there are probably 50 or more companies not in the S&P 500 that meet the criteria for inclusion at any moment. 10 It is usually safe to assume that the market impact of an S&P index addition begins when it is announced.
Deletions from S&P indexes are usually easier to predict than additions, and typically have much less market impact. because the changes were fully determined by the date CNS [2006] began to measure the composition change effect.
Relative to announced S&P index changes, the trading transparency cost of Russell index changes is more difficult to measure accurately or directly. The Russell index changes become certain gradually as the end of May approaches. While the changes are not certain until the end of May, a moment's reflection will suggest that the number of stocks whose status is significantly in question will be very small sometime before the composition changes are official.
Transparency cost is relatively easy to measure in S&P index additions.
A change is 100% certain when it is announced by S&P. We need not be concerned about anticipatory trades because few traders speculate on the S&P Committee's choice before the announcement. Using S&P 500 addition data from October 1989 through December 2002, CNS [2006] found that the abnormal return for stocks added to the S&P 500 on the first trading day after the announcement of their selection (+5.12%) was over 60% of the total abnormal return from the closing price just before the announcement until the close on the effective day of the index change (+8.37%). The trading session on the effective day is the time of greatest trading volume (liquidity demand), but the price change on the first day of trading after the announcement is usually the largest daily price change. Trading volume on the first day after the announcement is usually much larger than volume on an average trading day, but that day's volume is typically much smaller than volume on the effective date when the demand for liquidity is manifest. If we take the first day after the announcement's abnormal return as a reasonable proxy for an S&P addition's transparency cost, observed price behavior suggests that transparency cost has been more than 60% of the total market impact of S&P 500 additions through the moment the change becomes effective. composition changes in those indexes will also be anticipated by changes in the market prices of affected stocks in advance of full certainty of the index change. However, given the complexity of measuring the degree of trader anticipation of rule-based changes, the S&P-style "press release" or announcement disclosure model is likely to be our most useful source of transparency cost data.
ETF Custom Indexes
Issuers of new exchange-traded funds after 2001 had little choice but to base their products on less popular benchmarks or on custom indexes designed specifically for the ETF market. In most cases, these indexes have no significant applications other than as a fund template for a single ETF. This singularity of application suggests the possibility of relatively uncomplicated transparency cost analysis.
Most custom index ETFs are small, but some funds that have captured investor imaginations have attracted more than a billion dollars in assets. The use of index weighting systems that are not based on shares available to trade will increase trading costs for some small-cap issues entering or leaving these funds. The more the portfolios of these ETFs depart from the standard of capitalization weighting with a float adjustment, the greater the demand for liquidity will be whenever a composition change includes transactions in less liquid securities. A database of S&P-style press release transparent trades is already being accumulated with each composition change in custom index
ETFs that do not disclose their index rules. The cost differences between transparent trades initiated by changes in these indexes and comparable trades made anonymously in other portfolios will enable us to measure the added cost of transparency for the ETF's trades.
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For readers interested in learning more about fund transaction costs and transaction cost measurement, Edelen, Evans and Kadlec [2007] is useful and thought-provoking. Extensive background publications listed on the ITG website, www.itg.com, explain both the role of pretrade cost analysis models and the calculation of actual trading costs.
Some of the custom indexes used for ETFs are similar to the Russell indexes in the sense that the rules are published and anyone who cares can determine the changes before they are officially announced, simply by applying the rules. The extent to which index arbitrageurs will make these calculations depends on the trading opportunities a custom index ETF provides. If the fund has less than a few hundred million dollars in assets and consists entirely of large-cap stocks, the opportunity to profit from front running the index ETF's trades will be limited and few arbitrageurs will bother to collect the necessary information. A custom index ETF that has a few billion dollars in assets and a portfolio of stocks with small average capitalizations will soon become known to and loved by arbitrageurs. Measuring the transparency cost of trading for funds with rule-based indexes will be more difficult than measuring the transparency cost of press release disclosures of portfolio changes. Price changes occurring in advance of full determination of an impending change may even reduce the apparent liquidity cost. Ultimately, an analysis along the lines of Madhavan [2003] may be necessary to measure the cost of rule-based transparency.
Pre-Announced Actively Managed Fund Trades
Traditional active management, where the portfolio manager is a stock picker or an analyst who evaluates a number of calculations in an eclectic way to arrive at a decision, does not lend itself to gradual revelation of impending portfolio changes because the stock selection process is not transparent. Likewise, if a transparent quantitative model uses periodic accounting data as an input, the output of the model will be available only at discrete intervals. In this case, too, it is difficult to avoid the press release kind of transparency. Funds based on such models offer easy measurement of transparency costs and they will attract arbitrage traders as they grow. In the final analysis, obscuring the cost of transparency does not make the cost go away.
Investors in transparent funds -both indexed and actively managedwill eventually reach that conclusion.
A few special characteristics of some transparent trades in a truly actively managed ETF are worth a closer look. To the extent that transparency is required by the terms of a fund's registration documents, an announced trade -like an index composition tradewill probably be accomplished in a single trading session. If a particularly large transparent trade is to be made in a fund with a nontransparent active management process, the transaction might be announced piecemeal and executed in tranches over several days.
However announcement of such a series of trades is handled, any measure of the cost of transparency should be based on a comparison of the actual cost of the transparent trades to the pre-trade cost estimate of the most efficient way to execute the entire trade anonymously.
Another issue affecting measurement of the cost of transparency in an actively managed fund is that an active manager's trade is not "informationless". 18 In a transparent actively managed fund with a portfolio selected by a quantitative model that has stock-picking capabilities or by a human portfolio manager who has skill, a trade has greater future performance implications than an index composition change. The evidence that there is value in the purchase and sale decisions of at least some mutual fund portfolio managers (Cremers and Petajisto [2007] and Green and Hodges [2002] ) is very persuasive, as is the evidence that some investors can identify these managers in advance of such superior performance (Harlow and Brown [2006] , Wermers, Yao and Zhao [2006] and Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng [2006] ). In this context, front running of disclosed trades will hurt the performance of good managers. Correspondingly, the absence of arbitrage activity around an actively-managed fund's transparent trades will suggest low expectations for the manager or management process.
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Effect of Transparency Costs on Fund Performance
While generalizations in advance of collecting data are dangerous, it is appropriate to consider the range of trading transparency costs various kinds of ETFs might incur. The cost of trading transparency is unlikely to be a major concern for every custom index or transparent actively managed ETF because some funds will make very few portfolio composition changes. ETFs will be comparable to the funds' expense ratios.
Fund Portfolio Scale Trades
Portfolio scale trades in actively managed mutual funds, the last of the trade types listed in Exhibit 1, are "semi-transparent." As the size of a non-indexed mutual fund increases or decreases, the manager rarely changes the size of all fund positions proportionately, but cash inflows and outflows require regular trading in many of the fund's holdings.
The most useful studies measuring the cost of mutual fund flow trading (Edelen [1999] and Edelen, Evans & Kadlec [2007] Gastineau [2006a and b] describe these and other studies. 9 The Index Committee occasionally ignores one or more of these policies when it makes an index change.
10 Standard & Poor's [2007] , p. 6. Some of these candidates may appear on some of the index composition change lists mentioned in the opening paragraph of this paper, but few users of these lists buy a stock before the Index Committee announces its choice.
11 Part of the reason deletions have less market impact is that most of them are the inevitable result of a change in the company's status that is obvious before the Index Committee makes the change official. Only uncommon deletions like S&P's decision to drop foreign companies from the S&P 500 in 2002 and an occasional house cleaning to eliminate stocks that no longer "reflect and represent the U.S. stock market" are difficult to anticipate.
12 To clarify, Madhavan constructed and calculated returns for portfolios that were long the ultimately determined Russell 2000 additions and short the ultimately determined Russell 2000 deletions beginning three months before market participants were certain what the ultimate additions and deletions would be. The prices of these stocks generally moved up (additions) or down (deletions) as their status became more clear. In contrast to S&P deletions which usually coincide with a corporate event, stocks are removed from the Russell 2000 in the annual reconstitution solely on the basis of an increase or decrease in their capitalization ranking. 13 The official reconstitution -and the heaviest demand for liquidity -occurred at the end of June during these years.
14 The differences in methodology are not disturbing because the authors of these papers are focused on market impact costs associated with index composition changes. Madhavan [2003] 's use of a three-month window to measure what we characterize as the market impact cost of trading transparency is necessarily arbitrary, but reasonable.
15 On average, the composition change transaction costs for these index funds will be greater than for a capweighted fund, slightly offsetting some of the expected performance advantages described in Arnott, Hsu and Moore [2005] and Treynor [2005] .
16 Pre-trade transaction cost estimation models assume a trader uses a specific execution strategy, usually a strategy designed to minimize transaction costs. If a transparent trade must be executed within a narrow time window or if procedural requirements for an ETF portfolio change otherwise require a sub-optimal execution strategy, the portfolio will often experience higher trading costs than it would incur with an efficiently executed anonymous trade. Such requirements undoubtedly account for some of the index change costs in the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 experience. Although the additional cost may not be solely a result of revealing a demand for liquidity, the cost is part of the transparent trade execution process. Almgren and Chriss [2000] supports relatively aggressive trading tactics even when trading is anonymous, but many portfolio managers practice patient trading to improve returns by providing rather than demanding liquidity. Khandani and Lo [2007] describe a historically profitable hedge fund trading strategy that provides liquidity to aggressive traders. 17 The random arrival of orders makes actual transaction costs highly variable in specific instances. This variability requires analysis of a large number of transactions and calculation of average costs. 18 The addition or deletion of a stock in a benchmark index or a custom index designed as the template for an exchange-traded fund carries no information other than that the index composition is being changed and, as a consequence of the index change, a stock will be added to or deleted from one or more portfolios. The fact that some of these indexes are called active indexes, dynamic indexes or intelligent indexes has not been a reason to believe that the purchase by an index ETF of a security added to its index has any longterm implications for the performance of that security. 19 The literature also suggests that front running may capture much of the value the manager of a transparently trading fund brings to her stock selections. The presumed glamour of being an active ETF pioneer would be at least partly offset by the realization that trading transparency is a flawed approach to any form of active management. While my personal expectation is that a skilled portfolio manager will be reluctant to accept the assignment of managing a transparent actively managed ETF, some managers may reach a different conclusion. In any event, we will be able to measure the cost of these funds' transparency to the funds' investors.
20 Cited in Edelen, Evans and Kadlec [2007] p. 8.
21 See Broms and Gastineau [2007] . 22 The possible resurrection of sunshine trading to accommodate liquidity demands such as those associated with the apparent de-leveraging of long-short hedge fund portfolios in August 2007 is raised by Khandani and Lo [2007] 
